Big Kahunas, Small Returns: Why NZ’s $70m Stadium Fund Is Political Theatre, Not Economic Strategy

Amanda Riddell
Sep 15
5 min read

Introduction: The Glittering Bait

The New Zealand government’s recent announcement of a $70 million fund to attract global acts and major events has been packaged as a bold investment in the visitor economy. The headline message is simple: if Coldplay or Beyoncé stop in Auckland or Wellington, international tourists will pour in, hotels will fill up, and the tax take will more than cover the subsidy.

But once we dig beneath the marketing sheen, the cracks in the policy are obvious. The evidence about the actual balance of local vs international audiences is thin. Treasury’s own guidance warns against counting displaced local spending as new GDP. And a large chunk of the $70m is destined not for New Zealand businesses or workers, but for the pockets of international artists, their managers, and offshore promoters.

Far from being a prudent investment, the package looks more like political theatre — a myopic attempt to align the government with the “middle New Zealand” that fills stadiums, while ignoring the deeper structural challenges in tourism and events.

How the Fund Breaks Down

The $70m is carved into four streams:

$40m “Events Attraction Fund” to secure large-scale international events from 2026.
$10m “Events Boost” to support existing events and lure global ones.
$10m “Regional Tourism Boost Campaign” to market events and regions.
Up to $10m “Tourism Infrastructure Boost” to improve local facilities.

On paper, this balance appears sensible: invest in events, marketing, and the infrastructure needed to support them. In practice, the $40m attraction fund will likely be the lion’s share of direct subsidies, funneled into the contracts of mega-acts and their intermediaries.

Where the Money Actually Goes

Let’s be clear: when New Zealand “lures” a superstar stadium act, the biggest cheque is written to the artist and their promoter.

Artist fees: A top-tier act like Coldplay, Ed Sheeran, or Taylor Swift can command US$2–6 million per stadium show. At NZD exchange rates, that’s roughly NZ$3.5–10m per show.
Promoter margins: Global promoters (Live Nation, AEG, Frontier Touring) take significant cuts, covering logistics, marketing, and profit. These are overseas entities; their profits don’t stay in New Zealand.
Production imports: Large staging rigs, lighting, and touring equipment often arrive in shipping containers. Local crews are hired, but the most expensive kit and senior technical staff are imported.

If we imagine that $40m of the fund secures four or five mega-shows, we can reasonably estimate that at least 60–70% of those subsidies will flow offshore almost immediately. That’s $25–28m of taxpayer money leaving the country, enriching already wealthy global acts and their corporate promoters.

The infrastructure and marketing slices are smaller, but even there, global marketing firms often capture contracts. Local hospitality and tourism do see some benefit — but the lion’s share of government spending doesn’t circulate domestically.

The Domestic Displacement Problem

Even if $40m of subsidies did stay onshore, the bigger problem is that most of the people filling stadium seats are New Zealanders who would have spent money locally anyway.

Ticket spend: If a Kiwi spends $250 on a ticket, that’s money they might have spent at restaurants, bars, or domestic travel. It’s not new money in the economy, it’s displaced discretionary spend.
Food and beverage inside the stadium: Those dollars mostly flow to the stadium operator and the caterer, again shifting local spend rather than creating it.
Transport and accommodation: For Kiwis traveling from the regions, there is some redistribution (e.g. a Hamilton family staying in Auckland), but at the national level, it’s still domestic money sloshing around.

This is precisely why Treasury’s cost-benefit analysis guidelines stress the need to strip out displacement effects. Counting all ticket and bar sales as “economic impact” is double-counting.

The Thin Evidence on International Visitors

The government’s justification rests on the hope that stadium acts bring in hordes of international visitors. But what do we actually know?

Auckland Unlimited reported that 14 major concerts over three years generated $33.7m in local economic benefit. That’s about $2–3m per concert — not nothing, but not transformative.
Reports of visitor nights and hotel occupancy spikes show that some people do travel in, but these statistics lump together domestic and international visitors. There is no hard breakdown of how many flew in from Sydney, Los Angeles, or Singapore.
The median spend for an Australian visitor is about NZ$273/day, and they typically stay fewer nights than Americans or Europeans. They’re the most likely incremental market for concerts, but they’re also the lowest-value long-haul tourists.

In other words: while the narrative suggests Coldplay might lure thousands of high-spending tourists, the evidence points more toward a modest bump in Australian weekenders, not a flood of long-haul visitors.

The Facilities Disadvantage

New Zealand’s stadiums are smaller, older, and less technically advanced than Australia’s. Sydney’s Accor Stadium (83,500 capacity), Melbourne’s MCG (100,000), and Brisbane’s Suncorp (52,500) dwarf Eden Park or Sky Stadium.

Promoters already see New Zealand as an add-on stop, not a primary market. This is why subsidies are required: without government underwriting, many tours would simply end in Australia. But this means New Zealand is paying a premium to overcome its disadvantages, not building long-term competitiveness.

Political Optics vs Economic Strategy

Seen in this light, the $70m policy looks less like an economic masterstroke and more like political optics.

It allows ministers to align themselves with “fun” — to bask in the glow of Coldplay or Beyoncé announcing a New Zealand leg.
It panders to the image of “middle New Zealand” — ordinary families enjoying big nights out, even if those families would have bought tickets anyway.
It distracts from harder policy work: addressing New Zealand’s high travel costs, uneven regional tourism, and the structural underinvestment in infrastructure that limits visitor growth.

In short, it’s a loss-leader, designed for headlines rather than long-term economic return.

What Would Make More Sense

If the goal is genuine economic growth through events, the policy would need to:

Target international attendance explicitly: Require promoters to demonstrate projected overseas ticket sales and verify them with post-event surveys.
Tie subsidies to additionality: Only support events that can prove they wouldn’t otherwise come, with clawbacks if targets aren’t met.
Invest in infrastructure that endures: Upgrade venues, transport, and tourism facilities so New Zealand can host events competitively without ongoing subsidies.
Diversify the event mix: Support conferences, sports, cultural festivals, and niche events that attract high-value international visitors — not just mega-pop shows.
Publish transparent accounts: Break down exactly how much subsidy goes to artists, promoters, and local suppliers, so the public sees the true flow of funds.

Conclusion: Big Kahunas, Small Net Gains

On the surface, $70m for mega-events sounds like a win-win: global stars, sold-out stadiums, tourist dollars, and happy voters. But scratch the surface and the economics look shaky.

Most attendees are local; their spend is displaced, not new.
Most subsidies flow offshore, to artists and promoters who hardly need taxpayer help.
International tourism gains are modest, mostly Australians on short trips.
Facilities remain second-tier, keeping New Zealand dependent on subsidies.

The real beneficiaries are not taxpayers or struggling tourism operators, but global promoters and the politicians who get to pose next the end, this is less an economic growth strategy than a myopic piece of political theatre, designed to generate photo opportunities with “big kahuna” acts while eroding the credibility of public investment. [Yes, ChatGPT 5 wrote this, but I interrogated it, while I provided the analysis for that analysis essay on Mari Hamunata, and rewrote bits of the text]